Bid rigging and collusive bidding behind closed doors, collusion between insiders and outsiders to split the spoils, and collective corruption devouring water conservancy funds... Recent investigations by reporters have found that corruption cases in the water conservancy system occur frequently in many places, with officials involved ranging from department and division-level leaders down to section and unit-level cadres, and the regulatory loopholes exposed cannot be underestimated.
　　Fishing in Troubled Waters, Clustered Cases Frequent
　　In February this year, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee reported on the rectification of feedback from the Eighth Central Inspection Team. The report showed that since July 2013, a total of 24 cases of disciplinary and legal violations in the water conservancy system had been investigated, 13 concluded, and 13 people punished.
　　In April, Wen Lin, former member of the Party Committee and deputy director of the Jiangxi Provincial Department of Water Resources, was investigated on suspicion of serious disciplinary and legal violations; Yao Mugen, former vice governor of Jiangxi Province, was investigated and dealt with on suspicion of serious disciplinary and legal violations. Yao Mugen was in charge of water conservancy work during his tenure.
　　The procuratorate of a prefecture-level city in Hubei Province investigated 13 corruption cases in the water conservancy system in 2013, including 10 major cases, involving more than 2 million yuan. From 2012 to 2013, the procuratorial organs at the city and county levels in Fuzhou, Jiangxi, investigated a total of 21 clustered and related cases in the water conservancy system, involving 24 people. Among them were 4 county-level cadres and 9 section-level cadres, with 20 major cases involving 23 people, recovering economic losses of more than 32 million yuan for the state.
　　In June last year, the Henan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection reported 42 typical corruption cases involving water conservancy, and 64 Party members and cadres were dealt with for embezzling 26.12 million yuan. In a clustered case in a water conservancy bureau in a county in Guangxi investigated last year, several leading cadres fell from grace together, from the chief section member and discipline inspection team leader to the deputy director and the director.
　　"Water conservancy corruption mostly appears as clustered and related cases, in which someone is involved at every stage, often with the leader in charge of engineering projects and the engineers responsible for specific business all falling together." A case handler from a prefecture-level city procuratorate in Jiangxi told Banyuetan reporters that current water conservancy corruption cases are often related to water conservancy policies, and however long a policy lasts, the process of duty-related crime continues for just as long. For a small-scale farmland water conservancy project completed in 3 years, the entire process of duty-related crime would last 3 years.
　　Some Water Conservancy Projects Have Become "Profit-Making Schemes"
　　On February 27 this year, Tang Shuqing, former deputy director of the Shangli County Water Affairs Bureau in Jiangxi Province, and Zhang Jiansheng, former head of the water management station of the same bureau, were sentenced to 3 years in prison with a 4-year reprieve for accepting bribes. According to the case handlers, from 2009 to 2011, Tang Shuqing, using the convenience of his position in charge of farmland water conservancy construction, sought benefits for Yang Lin, a contractor for U-shaped channel projects in small-scale farmland water conservancy, and accepted bribes 7 times totaling 85,000 yuan; Zhang Jiansheng provided convenience to Yang Lin by supplying information and setting favorable conditions in the bidding process, and received cash from Yang Lin 8 times totaling 91,000 yuan.
　　Banyuetan reporters' investigation found that collusion between officials and businessmen, using bid rigging and collusive bidding to illegally obtain water conservancy projects, has become a common tactic. In June 2011, when the procuratorate of a prefecture-level city in a central province reviewed the bidding for local reservoir maintenance and reinforcement, it found 23 enterprises engaged in bid rigging and collusive bidding. The discipline inspection commission of another prefecture-level city in the province reported a case in the bidding field involving a subject matter of more than 200 million yuan and disciplinary violations amounting to more than 16 million yuan. The case involved 21 collusive bidding projects, more than 100 colluding companies, and 22 Party and government leading cadres.
　　"Once a power-for-money deal is reached, from project bidding, project acceptance to project payment disbursement and other key stages, it is often all green lights." One case handler told reporters.
　　Cheng Guansong, director of the Institute of Law at the Jiangxi Academy of Social Sciences, believes that corruption in the water conservancy engineering field mainly exists in the approval and engineering construction stages. "China's laws and regulations on project approval and engineering construction are relatively complete, but law enforcement is constrained by the current operation of power." He pointed out that at present, the management method in many fields and departments in China is the administrative chief responsibility system, with each system decided by the leader in charge, which may turn the field under their charge into a personal "private garden," alienating public power into private power, and reducing administrative law enforcement resources and approval power resources to personal privileges, which easily breeds corruption.
　　"Explicit Rules" Hard to Defeat "Hidden Rules"
　　Reporters' investigation found that because in some local water conservancy projects a fair and orderly market competition mechanism has not yet formed, the bidding mechanism is not sufficiently complete, and relevant laws and regulations are not operable, it is hard to defeat industry "hidden rules."
　　Some case handlers believe that the prevalence of "hidden rules" exposes supervision loopholes. On the one hand, the external supervision mechanism over power is inadequate. Because discipline inspection, supervision, or procuratorial organs cannot go deep into the specific stages of engineering construction, supervision is difficult, and the supervision mechanism exists in name only, remaining at post-event supervision, often missing the opportunity to eliminate corruption in the bud and causing huge losses. On the other hand, the operation of power within the water conservancy system is not standardized. Internal supervision and restraint over the leadership team in the water conservancy system are inadequate, the operation of administrative power deviates from the established track, and leaders in charge overstep legal boundaries, abusing power and seeking personal gain for their own selfish interests.
　　During interviews, some grassroots prosecutors suggested that full-process synchronous prevention of duty-related crime in key water conservancy projects should be carried out, with synchronous prevention at stages such as project initiation, bidding, project construction supervision, project acceptance, and project payment disbursement, supervising standardized operation, plugging institutional loopholes, and increasing investigation and punishment efforts.
　　At the same time, institutional development and supervision and restraint mechanisms must be improved, and an internal supervision and restraint mechanism that makes corruption impossible should be established. Further improve the scientific and democratic decision-making system, improve the water conservancy government affairs disclosure system, and accelerate the implementation of administrative accountability and performance management systems. Strengthen special inspection and auditing of key water conservancy engineering construction projects, increase special inspection of projects such as reinforcement of dangerous reservoirs and rural drinking water safety, and strengthen supervision over all stages including preliminary work, construction management, quality and safety, and completion acceptance.
　　In response to problems in the water conservancy construction field, Jiangxi Province has already taken many measures to curb corruption in the water conservancy system. First, verify 4,251 personnel and 1,160 performance information records of 248 enterprises on the water conservancy project online trading platform, and stop the project bidding qualification of those confirmed to be false information for 3 years; second, carry out pilot reform of small water conservancy project construction, promote the model of establishing project legal persons at the county and township levels, and roll out this reform province-wide by the end of the year; third, strengthen the construction of the water conservancy project online trading platform to achieve full coverage of electronic bidding for water conservancy projects at the provincial, city, and county levels; fourth, strengthen post-bid management of water conservancy project construction, focusing on supervision of project quality, measurement and payment, and production safety; fifth, strengthen tracking and supervision of water conservancy project construction funds, strengthen auditing of water conservancy project construction, and ensure the safety of water conservancy fund management.
　　In view of the characteristics of rural small water conservancy construction, which is scattered across many points and wide in scope and prone to regulatory loopholes, Cheng Guansong believes that localities should also focus on increasing corruption prevention in rural small water conservancy construction to prevent rural small water conservancy from becoming a severe disaster area for corruption.
　　"As rural water conservancy construction is a key task of the state for a considerable period, corresponding supervision should also sink to the grassroots level, focusing on checking possible corruption in stages such as project design, bidding, project supervision, project construction, and project inspection and acceptance of small water conservancy projects." Cheng Guansong believes that the government should strengthen approval of subject qualifications and assessment of project quality, leave other stages to the market, and reduce stages for power rent-seeking. He suggested trying to package rural small water conservancy projects as a whole for bidding, facilitating centralized supervision and targeted governance, and that the government can purchase public services through entrustment, contracting, and procurement, outsourcing material procurement and construction to other qualified market entities.